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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

29 December 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
THROUGH : Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM : David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT : Evaluation of DI Performance in
Falkland Islands Crisis

The DI evaluation is a well-wrought, objective review of warning and crisis management actions leading up to and during the Falkland Islands crisis. Although I had no direct involvement in the crisis the findings are consistent with my understandings of what happened and contain no surprises. Unfortunately, the problems and recommendations are all too familiar and could have been attributed to most crises over the last twenty years. The 1983 NIO/W Agenda addresses many of the problems raised by the review team.

One could debate how well the actual "warning" was effected, but it would be an empty exercise. There are, however, three minor criticisms to be made:

- The NODIS problem has persisted despite numerous assurances, through many administrations, that critical policy information would not be withheld. No ad hoc agreements will solve this problem. State Operations Center must be given the authority to release selected NODIS cables in time of crisis.
- Similarly I believe strongly that ad hoc task forces can not be fully effective unless there is strong permanent support mechanism. The role of the CIA Operations Center appears to limited at this time but would seem to be the logical place for maintaining such a capability.

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--There are planning inconsistencies in terms of CMASS versus SAFE. Either CMASS should be integrated into SAFE or continued development as a competing system should be stopped. There could be a significant impact in the short run on the ability of DI analysts to access critical information.

It is noted that large parts of the study have been shared with Defense. Such sharing should be encouraged and would benefit significantly the community at large.

The role of the NIC will remain more in warning than in crisis management. The strength of the NIC is its ability to stand back from current intelligence concerns and provide deeper and broader perspectives. Any pressures, even self-generated, to become involved in current situations should be vigorously resisted. Because of the requirement for an alternative view point it is critical to remain autonomous and not force the NIOs to rigidly coordinate all papers and hypothesis. This does not obviate the need for both current awareness and continued involvement of the NIO/W in system improvements.



David V. McManis

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